Abstract

This article analyzes the concept of intentional criminal conduct in criminal law, highlighting the need to link legal theory with social reality. The author criticizes excessive dogmatic formalism and proposes a more comprehensive approach that takes social, political, and criminological factors into account. The main schools of thought in criminal theory—causalism, finalism, and functionalism—are reviewed, explaining how each conceives of action, culpability, and intent. In particular, the article emphasizes the evolution of the concept of intent, its relationship to the subject’s intention, and its place within the structure of the crime. The text also addresses the difference between intent and negligence, particularly in Mexico City’s legislation, highlighting the practical complexity of distinguishing between concepts such as eventual intent and negligence with foreknowledge. Furthermore, it discusses the issue of where intent is situated (within the definition of the offense or within culpability) and concludes that Mexican criminal law takes a mixed or debated stance on this matter. Finally, the text invites reflection on the role of criminal law in society, emphasizing that it should not be merely a repressive instrument but rather a tool oriented toward justice, prevention, and respect for human rights.